铁道部


静止图象传输系统管理办法（试行）
1993年11月3日，铁道部

第一章 总 则
铁路静止图象传输系统是全路抢险救灾应急通信的重要组成部分，其主要任务是传送运输生产中非常情况的图象信息，以满足领导部门对抢险救灾、处理事故的实时调度指挥。
静止图象传输系统依托于既有的铁路通信电路，本系统的维护管理必须树立全程全网观念，实行统一指挥，分级管理的原则，落实岗位责任制，搞好密切协作。
为了加强静止图象传输系统的管理，充分发挥系统的效能，使之适应铁路安全生产的需要，特制订《静止图象传输系统管理办法》（试行），各单位必须遵照执行。
本办法由铁道部电务局负责解释。
第1－1条 静止图象传输系统的终端设备主要由摄像机、图象处理机、显示器、打印机、调制解调器组成。根据使用场合，终端设备可分为固定型和携带型。
第1－2条 静止图象传输系统是铁路通信网的一部分，它的构成、运用和调整由铁道部统一安排管理。日常分工：干线由铁道部电力局调度管理；局线由铁路局（含集团公司，以下同）和铁路分局（含总公司，以下同）电务调度分别管理。
第1－3条 静止图象传输系统维护工作实行铁路局、铁路分局、电务段（通信段）三级管理。
第1－4条 静止图象传输系统的图象信息传送，必须按照国家有关通信保密的规定执行。凡在通信中涉及国家机密的，应采取严格的保密措施。
第1－5条 静止图象传输设备的管理维护单位，应建立正常的维护工作秩序，编制检修工作计表，保证设备经常处于良好的工作状态。
第1－6条 静止图象传输系统是一种含图象、计算机、通信等多媒体技术，其理论较深，技术难度较大，为保证设备的维护质量，各级管理和维护部门必须切实加强职工的技术业务培训，不断提高人员素质。并经常检查执行情况，定期进行考核。
新职和改职人员须经培训、考试，取得合格证后方能上岗。

第二章 一 般 规 定
第2－1条 静止图象传输可采用自动（人工）话路或指定专用电路。
第2－2条 静止图象传输系统采用的电路，部至局由部电务局调度指定，局至分局由局电务调度指定，分局至区间由分局电务调度指定。
第2－3条 抢险救灾应急通信在区间可以利用其它通信手段，如增开双路载波、无线接力，以保证应急通信电路畅通。
第2－4条 在电路音频二线端应将振铃器断开。为保证静止图象的传输的质量和设备安全，在架空明线区段要介入带宽为300～3400Ｈｚ的线路滤波器和加装保安设备。
第2－5条 静止图象传输设备和通信线路的维护分界：小电话连接方式是以外线接入图象处理机的接线端子为分界点；专用线连接方式是以外线进入调度工区的第一端子为分界点。
第2－6条 静止图象设备传输电平应符合长途或地区接口电平的规定。按照有线通信《维规》规定其输出电平为－13ｄＢｍ0。
第2－7条 静止图象的固定型设备，应设在各级事故抢险指挥中心（铁道部运输局调度值班处长室、铁路局运输处值班科长室、铁路分局运输科调度所值班主任室），部、局和分局的事故抢险指挥中心至长途机械室之间应配有静止图象传输线路。
第2－8条 各级负责静止图象值机人员，在接到命令后应在30分钟内出动，并随单位领导或安监室人员到达现场。
第2－9条 静止图象传输设备的操作人员，每套设定员三至五人。平时要建立值班制度，防洪期间实行三班轮班制，做到能随时出发，常备不懈。一但需要能马上与抢险救援人员一起出动，要求到现场后一小时内传送图象。
第2－10条 静止图象传输专用电路的接通、关闭由各级电务调度下达命令，各级长途机械室、电话会议室、调度工区、通信工区执行。

第三章 设 备 管 理
第3－1条 静止图象传输设备是重要的通信器材，必须按照固定资产的管理办法进行调拨、移设、使用和报废，应建立主要设备及附属设备、备件及技术资料档案。所有设备必须保证随时启用，质量良好。
第3－2条 新购的静止图象设备应按照有关技术质量标准进行验收。合格后方可投入运用。
第3－3条 各维护单位根据需要应适当配置静止图象设备关键部分备件，现场携带机应配备轻便型电源。
第3－4条 静止图象设备的管理，应包括主用和备用设备及其附件，各类设备均应建立设备履历卡片。
第3－5条 静止图象设备每次使用及使用方式应及时填写使用登记表。
第3－6条 各维护单位应根据设备维护工作需要，配备必要的工具、仪表，并建立相应的管理制度。
第3－7条 各维护单位应备有以下主要技术资料：
1．交接班本及工作日志。
2．静止图象传输系统技术资料及设备说明书。
3．设备履历卡片。
4．检修记录本。
5．使用登记本。

第四章 图象的采集、传送及资料管理
第4－1条 静止图象的采集、传送要做到及时、清晰、根据现场条件可采用现场直接传送或将现场摄取的录象带送到附近的通信站进行传送。
第4－2条 静止图象的采集，应由熟悉被采集图象的专业人员承担，也可由负责静止图象人员协助采录。采集的图象内容准确，并要求画面同时显示摄制的日期、时间。
第4－3条 静止图象的传输是一项极为严肃的工作，无论分局对路局，或路局对铁道部，必须凭有领导签字的“静止图象传送工作单”进行传送，并在工作单上认真填写有关项目。工作单由各级安全监察人员填报，经领导批准后交静止图象传送人员执行。
第4－4条 “静止图象传送工作单”工作流程是：
1．安全监察人员在现场确认选定要传送的图象。
2．由静止图象传送工作人员将屏幕图象定格、编号。
3．将选定的图象或图象编号，打印或写在工作单上。
4．由负责填报人员送现场领导审批、签字。
5．交静止图象人员发送。
6．将工作单存档。
第4－5条 因突发事件或自然灾害而采集的图象资料，属于国家机密的，应由专人保管，并建立档案编写登记。图象资料录相带交安监部门保管时，应有交接手续。
第4－6条 图象资料不能随意复制及私自借出。
第4－7条 因传输需要而存于图象处理机硬盘的图象资料，在传输工作告一段落后，要予以删除，防止泄密。

第五章 设 备 维 护
第5－1条 静止图象传输设备采取日常检测和定期检修两种维修方式。
第5－2条 每月检修项目如下：
1．外部清扫及连接线、插接件检查。
2．各项功能设置及检查试验。
3．附属设备检查（线路滤波器、保安设备等）。
4．电池充电。
5．输出电平测试检查。
第5－3条 每月进行联机试验：部至局、局至分局、分局至电务段，可以利用长途自动电路进行（应向有关电务调度要点），双方进行直观评定，并做记录。
第5－4条 每季进行一次室外试验：根据各种地形、条件、选点传送图象，试验昼夜两种状态。
第5－5条 每年定期检修一次：按照静止图象传输系统质量标准测试，更换不合格的部件。
第5－6条 静止图象传输系统设备在维护中发现严重的故障，应立即通知厂家或送到维修中心处理，并向本级电务调度报告。

第六章 值班人员工作职责
第6－1条 值班人员要爱护设备，保证设备处于良好状态。现场设备要做好方便携带的准备，以便随时奔赴现场。
第6－2条 值班人员应严格遵守有关保密规定，禁止向无关人员透露静止图象有关资料内容。
第6－3条 值班人员要按维护周期定期检查维护设备。
第6－4条 在抢险救灾中，值班操作人员对图象资料的采集范围、传送方式，要按照部、局、分局事故抢险指挥中心领导决策而定，不得自作主张。
第6－5条 值班人员不准把静止图象设备器材借于他人或私自使用。


Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.